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This paper will seek to trace and explain the diverging and non-linear trajectories of the three central 
Maghreb countries’ foreign policies towards the European Union (EU) since the 2011 Arab uprisings. 
Firstly, the analysis will be situated within the big structural picture and debates about the putative 
decline of the Western-based liberal international order, including the EU’s influence over its outer 
periphery or neighbourhood, although emphasis will be subsequently placed on the “southern agency” 
manifested by Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria in this structural context. Secondly, some background 
will be provided regarding the longstanding features of Maghreb-EU relations and the factors that 
account for them globally, as well as for each individual state’s bilateral differentiation in the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This will include an examination of 
postcolonial legacies, the debate on the degree of dependence or interdependence that characterises 
the EU-Maghreb relationship from an international political economy perspective, the realist 
hindrances to liberal region-building between the Maghreb countries themselves, and the history-
dependent allocation of foreign policy roles and bilateral differentiation, which has been further 
emphasised by the ENP since 2004-2005. 
 
Thirdly, change and continuity in the Tunisia, Moroccan and Algerian post-2011 bilateral trajectories 
vis-à-vis the EU will be analysed by contrasting various theory-based perspectives and explanatory 
factors, i.e. economic dependence (international political economy) or interdependence 
(neoliberalism), global power shifts (neorealism), national security, territoriality and sovereignty 
(classical realism), and national identities and foreign policy roles (constructivism). The analytical 
method employed for explaining the diverging trajectories of the Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan 
foreign policies towards the EU since 2011 will be process tracing. This involves a systematic 
scrutiny of sequences or chains of phenomena that unfold over time with the aim of evaluating the 
alternative causal explanations of change that are embedded in existing narratives. Therefore, the first 
step in the analysis will be to reconstruct the time sequence of events, interactions and decisions in 
each Maghreb country’s post-2011 bilateral relationship with the EU, identifying turning points or 
junctures. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn as to which factors constitute drivers of change or 
continuity in each country’s EU policy, which of them account for specific turning points in the 
bilateral trajectories and the extent to which some of the processes identified may represent instances 
of “de-Europeanisation”. 
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A Declining Western-Based Liberal International Order and EU Influence over its 
Neighbourhood 
 
Nearly a decade into the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the coincidence of the United 
States (US)’ announced withdrawal from various international agreements under the Trump 
presidency (Bump, 2018) and the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU has pushed the hitherto 
scholarly debate about the decline of the so-called liberal international order (Acharya, 2014) to the 
press headlines and public discussion. The realisation of the “rise of the non-West” – or the “rise of 
the rest” – in global politics and more recent concerns about the apparent beginning, in both the West 
and the non-West, of the “reverse wave” of the “third wave of democratisation” initiated in the mid-
1970s (Huntington, 1991) are also part of the picture. The liberal international order is the set of 
arrangements that were put in place in 1945 by the Western victors of World War II, under US 
leadership, in order to organise relations among themselves and their allies around “economic 
openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity” (Ikenberry, 2018, 
p. 7). In its increasingly global institutional dimension, this has been most prominently embodied in 
the United Nations (UN) and the UN system, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its post-1994 successor the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, i.e. the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – all of which share the US provision of “global public goods” as 
their common denominator (Nye, 2017). 
 
While the liberal international order had an in-built expansionist tendency from the outset, it was the 
end of the Cold War that allowed it to outgrow its original half of the bipolar system and acquire a 
truly global reach. Seventy years later, however, the widespread sense that its foundations are 
trembling has gone as far as to make all theoretical schools of International Relations (IR) for once 
concur on a diagnosis: “That world order is at a crossroads, and that there is no sign marked ‘straight 
ahead’” (Duncombe & Dunne, 2018, p. 31). Current debates question what is in crisis exactly: are we 
witnessing a crisis of authority, i.e. of the US post-1945 and post-1991 hegemonic leadership; of 
internationalism as a pre-existing, two-century-old political vision for peaceful and law-based 
relations between sovereign states; or of liberalism as the theoretical, normative and ideological 
substratum underpinning the latter together with its domestic dimension? These three elements should 
not be conflated and may be actually detaching from one another. 
 
What is the place of the EU and its southern neighbours of the Maghreb in this big global story? To 
start with, 1945’s Western Europe and its successive incarnations, the European Economic 
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Community (EEC) and the EU, have been the primary partners for the US – along with Japan – in the 
construction and upholding of the liberal international order. Europe being “the quiet bulwark of the 
wider international order” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 7), the five convictions that have for decades sustained 
the latter are the very same ones that lie at the heart of the European integration project: trade 
openness, rules-based multilateral governance, security cooperation and community-building, 
reformism and a liberal democratic vision of progress (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 11). This also applies to the 
various policies and cooperation frameworks that the EU has set up over the years in order to deal 
with its Southern Mediterranean neighbours, most notably the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) and the 2004 ENP. 
 
Devised during the golden age of the EU’s region-building optimism with the promise of forging a 
novel “Mediterranean” regional identity that would cut across taken-for-granted geopolitical divides, 
the EMP was a distinctly liberal policy in its transformation ambitions for Southern Mediterranean 
countries. The envisaged “area of shared prosperity, peace and stability” (Council of the European 
Union, 1995) was supposed to rest on three mutually reinforcing liberal – if not neoliberal – logics: 
economic reform driven by trade opening and liberalisation, political reform in the direction of 
democratisation, and regional cooperation through multilateralism (Solingen & Ozyurt, 2006, pp. 58-
66). An excess of wishful thinking was noted from the outset by more realist-minded observers, who 
pointed to the structural asymmetry of the Mediterranean North-South relationship and the hegemonic 
nature of the policies of the EU (Attinà, 2003; Philippart, 2003), a “half-way hegemon” applying a 
“half-way hegemonic strategy” (Costalli, 2009, p. 324). Ten years later, the ENP broadened the 
geographical scope of EU action and shifted the emphasis from multilateral region-building to 
differentiated bilateralism (Bicchi, Noutcheva & Voltolini, 2018), but remained similarly liberal in its 
underlying assumptions. The most important of these was a trust in the EU’s attraction force and 
capacity to exert substantial influence in its outer periphery, based not only on its material 
capabilities, enabling various forms of conditionality, but also on its distinctive “normative power” 
(Manners, 2002). By the time the Arab uprisings broke out in 2010-2011, both the 
multilateralism/socialisation approach of the EMP and differentiated bilateralism/conditionality 
approach of the ENP had already shown their flaws and limitations. The EMP had been replaced by a 
more functionalist and allegedly de-politicised Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) back in 2008, 
while a first review of the ENP was also underway. 
 
Still, as outlined in the joint communication “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”, the 
2011 review of the ENP was marked by overall continuity in terms of both goals and methods. If 
anything, the EU’s stronger emphasis on “democratic transformation” (European Commission, 2011a, 
p. 3) and providing “greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy – the kind that 
lasts” (European Commission, 2011b, p. 2) acted as a late reminder of the liberal values that were 
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expected to lie at the heart of the EU’s external action. Yet, overall, it can be contended that the EU’s 
strategic responses to the Arab uprisings under the ENP framework were weighed down by “inherent 
contradictions and lack of innovation in relation to past policies,” which “eventually deprived them of 
the value-based and progressive effect envisaged on paper” (Fernández-Molina, 2017a, p. 303). In 
more recent years, as the promised “ring of friends” turned into a “ring of fire” to both the East and 
the South of the EU (Taylor, 2015), the EU institutions could no longer hide from the fact that the 
ENP had been largely ineffective, if not a failure, as a “structural foreign policy” (Keukeleire & 
Delreux, 2014, p. 28). This was compounded with the realisation of the decline of the EU’s own 
influence over its neighbourhood, in comparison to the growing clout of other powerful “neighbours 
of the neighbours” (Gstöhl & Lannon, 2018) such as Russia (Ghanem & Kuznetsov, 2018) and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Schumacher & Fernández Molina, 2013), and as part of the 
wider weakening of the Western-based liberal international order. 
 
A second review of the ENP released in 2015 was to acknowledge for the first time that “the EU 
cannot alone solve the many challenges of the region, and there are limits to its leverage” (European 
Commission, 2015, p. 2). This newfound modesty led the EU institutions to announce that “the new 
ENP will now seek to involve other regional actors, beyond the neighbourhood, where appropriate, in 
addressing regional challenges” (European Commission, 2015, p. 3). At the same time, an apparent 
retreat of the EU from its role as the promoter of the liberal international order in its neighbourhood 
was also originating from the inside. The joint communication presenting the 2015 ENP review 
denied any tension between values and interests in EU foreign policy: “The EU will pursue its 
interests which include the promotion of universal values” (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). 
However, the reality was that, despite this attempt to square the circle in line with the “principled 
pragmatism” advocated in the 2016 EU Global Strategy (Juncos, 2017), priority clearly lay with 
interests. Furthermore, democracy and human rights goals were explicitly portrayed as subject to co-
ownership with each of the mostly authoritarian neighbours of the EU: “The ENP will seek more 
effective ways to promote reforms with each partner in mutually agreed formats.” “Human rights and 
democracy will continue to be an agenda item in our political dialogue with all partners in mutually 
agreed formats” (European Commission, 2015, p. 5, 6, emphasis added). In sum, the wane of the 
liberal international order is not just associated to the relative power loss, reconsideration of 
internationalism and erosion of some liberal values on the side of the US; the same processes seem to 
be underway in EU foreign policy in general and the ENP in particular. 
 
The Longstanding Features of Maghreb-EU Relations 
 
Turning our gaze to the longue durée, when it comes to the Maghreb states, the longstanding 
EU/European influence has unmistakably colonial roots. All of the core characteristics of the EU-
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Maghreb relationship(s) that persist until today were shaped by the processes of colonisation and 
decolonisation of the 19th and 20th centuries. What is more, the structural features of the Maghreb in 
itself cannot be understood without European penetration either. French colonialism moulded the 
international political economy of this region by orienting trade and capital flows across the 
Mediterranean in a vertical, hub-and-spoke fashion. Indeed, to date, each country’s separate vertical 
North-South exchanges continue to overshadow and hinder horizontal South-South flows in the 
Maghreb. Moreover, their trade relationships with the EU have constantly displayed a strong 
asymmetry between the respective weights of bilateral trade for each of the sides (Fernández-Molina, 
2018a, pp. 325-327). In 2017 the EU was the largest trading partner for all of the five Maghreb 
countries and the source or recipient of over 50% of the total trade with the world of all but 
Mauritania. By contrast, the Maghreb countries – including both “oil haves” and “oil have-nots” – 
occupied almost insignificant positions (1% of total trade at the most) in the ranking of the EU’s top 
trading partners. 
 
Table 1. Share (%) of trade with EU-28 in the Maghreb countries’ total trade with the world (2017) 
 Imports Exports Total trade 
Algeria 43.7 58.9 50.3 
Libya 26.7 67.4 54.9 
Mauritania 28.5 35.0 27.4 
Morocco 56.5 64.6 59.4 
Tunisia 53.5 78.0 63.2 
Source: European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/statistics/index_en.htm), data processed by author 
 
Table 2. Share (%) of trade with Maghreb countries in EU-28’s total trade with the world (2017) 
 Imports Exports Total trade 
Algeria 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Libya 0.6  0.2 0.4 
Mauritania 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Morocco 0.8 1.2 1.0 
Tunisia 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Source: European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/statistics/index_en.htm), data processed by author 
 
The big debate that stems from this data asks whether the overall structural nature of the Maghreb-EU 
economic relationship is better described by the liberal concept of interdependence, which broadly 
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refers to the interconnection and mutual reliance between international actors, or the post-Marxist 
notion of dependency, which stresses the imbalance between two unequal parties, a centre-periphery 
pattern of domination and exploitation of the peripheral economy, and common interests between the 
capitalist centre and the peripheral “clientele class”. One mixed answer argues that, while displaying 
some symptoms of dependency, the Maghreb’s relationship with Europe is mainly one of “high 
asymmetrical interdependence”, for “both parties would incur costs if the relationship were broken” 
(Aghrout, 2000, pp. 14-16). Potential costs for the European side would affect mainly energy security 
– i.e. the provision of natural gas by Algeria, the EU’s third largest supplier after Russia and Norway, 
and a vital one for Spain, Italy, Portugal and France – and, beyond the economic sphere, security and 
migration control. 
 
From a liberal interdependence approach, these structural conditions have logically played a major 
role in perpetuating the exceptionally low level of transnational economic and social connection, let 
alone regional integration, which can be observed among the Maghreb countries. At the same time, 
realist IR theory also has much to say about the bleak history of Maghrebi regionalism and the role of 
inter-state security dilemmas therein. The interesting fact is that such durable mistrust has been to a 
large extent associated with bilateral territorial disputes that originated in colonial border redrawing, 
as well as the ensuing decolonisation and state-building processes. The postcolonial legacy of French 
remapping included the only direct armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria, i.e. the 1963 Sands 
War. On a related note, while the size of its territory and the energy resources discovered in the 1950s 
made it the ideal candidate for this role, independent Algeria failed to ever become a distinct regional 
hegemon (Fernández-Molina, 2018a, p. 325). As a result, competition for regional hegemony and 
power balancing dynamics were to characterise international relations within the Maghreb system 
unceasingly for decades, albeit falling short of armed conflict in most cases. These tensions have been 
described as a “harmless game” for the incumbent regimes; that is, one that “allows them at the same 
time to survive domestic crises, strengthen the institutions they defend or embody and, ultimately, 
maintain a relatively controlled pragmatic balance” (Hami, 2003, pp. 18-19). The main exception to 
this harmlessness has been the protracted conflict of Western Sahara, caused by a deviant and 
thwarted decolonisation process in the wake of the Spanish withdrawal in 1975-1976, and pitting 
Morocco against the pro-independence Polisario Front, supported by Algeria. This remains a huge 
stumbling block impeding Maghrebi region-building in spite of being frozen since 1991. 
 
From a constructivist perspective, the legacy of colonisation and decolonisation in the Maghreb 
includes two contradictory identity-based factors that continue to constrain relations within the region 
as well as with Europe: the norm of regional federation or unification consolidated in the times of 
parallel anticolonial struggles, and each state’s individual nationalism and foreign policy roles 
embedded during the postcolonial state- and nation-building processes (Stora, 2003). The latter 
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converge with political economy factors associated with natural resource endowment – the “structure-
identity nexus” (Daoudy, 2016) – in explaining the longstanding differentiation between the various 
Maghreb countries’ bilateral relationships with the EU. Three distinct roles may be distinguished in 
this respect from the 1960s-1970s until at least the first decade of the 2000s: two aspiring “model 
students of the EU” (Tunisia and Morocco), a “bad student” (Algeria) and a “rogue state” that was in 
the process of being “reintegrated” into the international community at the turn of the millennium 
(Libya). Not coincidentally, it is “oil have-nots” that have historically tended to behave as “model 
students” by pursuing consistently cooperative trajectories vis-à-vis the EU, while “oil haves” have 
displayed a more selective, pragmatic and at times uninterested behaviour (Fernández-Molina, 2018a, 
pp. 328-329). In conclusion, “geographical differentiation” (Barbé & Herranz-Surrallés, 2012, p. 3) in 
Maghreb-EU relations predated by far the ENP’s emphasis on differentiated bilateralism. What the 
latter did was mostly to consolidate and somewhat rejuvenate the divergent paths already travelled by 
Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. 
 
Explaining the Post-2011 Bilateral Trajectories and Turning Points 
 
Against this backdrop, and in spite of the aforementioned continuity bias in EU foreign policy and the 
ENP, the 2011 Arab uprisings did bring some novelties to Maghreb-EU relations. There was no major 
policy discontinuity as such but, at least in the short term, some readjustments appeared to be 
imperative on both sides of the bilateral relationships between Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, on the 
one hand, and the EU, on the other. This section aims to establish the sequence of events and timeline 
of these three counties’ relations with the EU in the aftermath of such a turbulent year, as the basis for 
subsequent process tracing. 
 
In the case of Tunisia, the only central Maghreb country where the 2011 uprising turned into a full-
blown revolution resulting in regime change, the main milestones of the relationship with the EU can 
be found in 2011, 2012, 2014-2015 and 2018. In 2011, the rapidly changing tone of the EU’s 
declaratory diplomacy in the midst of the revolution – with joint statements by the High 
Representative (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton and the Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP Štefan 
Füle moving from tepid calls for “restraint in the use of force” to expressions of “support and 
recognition to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations” – ended up in Brussels’ promise, 
in mid-February, to act as “Tunisia’s strongest ally in their move towards democracy” (Fernández-
Molina, 2017a, pp. 307-308). The first formalisation of such backing involving some Tunisian 
political input, in the autumn of the same year, was the establishment of an EU-Tunisia Task Force, 
co-chaired by the HR/VP and the interim Tunisian Prime Minister Beji Caid el Sebsi, with the aim of 
coordinating European financial support for the Tunisian transition. Among other things, Tunisia was 
selected as one of the four recipients of the funding of the brand new Support to Partnership, Reforms 
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and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme, which the EU launched for this purpose under the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This was followed by the dispatch of 
an EU Election Observation Mission to monitor the inaugural Tunisian Constituent Assembly 
elections of October 2011. 
 
2012 was the year of the institutionalisation of the EU’s recognition for Tunisia as the “success story” 
of the “Arab Spring” within bilateral relations. This occurred in two parallel ways, both in the 
framework of the ENP and by decision of the bilateral EU-Tunisia Association Council (i.e. involving 
joint ownership) in November that year: by concluding a new ENP Action Plan to replace the one 
from July 2005 and by establishing a special bilateral relationship – however symbolic and unclear in 
terms of added value – in the form of the so-called Privileged Partnership. Although the former was 
actually part of a scheduled renewal across all ENP countries, in the Tunisian case it was presented as 
the “Privileged Partnership’s Action Plan” (Council of the EU, 2012); that is, the policy 
materialisation of the stepping up and new era of the bilateral relationship. The 2012 milestone was 
also preceded by a visit to Tunis of the President of the European Commission (EC) Jean-Claude 
Juncker in late October. Subsequently, 2014-2015 saw more specific advances in pursuance of the 
“three Ms” (European Council, 2011) promised by the 2011 joint communication “A Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” (European Commission, 2011a, 
p. 3). While the SPRING programme had already provided Tunisia with additional EU “money”, the 
post-2011 “mobility” agenda led to the conclusion of an EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership in 2014, 
with negotiations on visa facilitation scheduled to begin in 2016. As regards the new EU “market” 
incentive, i.e. the offer of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) to four Southern 
Mediterranean frontrunners, it resulted in a negotiation process being initiated between Tunisia and 
the EC in 2015. 
 
A series of incremental steps followed in 2016, including the release of the joint communication 
Strengthening EU Support for Tunisia (European Commission, 2016) – the first of its kind focusing 
on a specific southern neighbourhood country –, the launch of the EU-Tunisia Joint Parliamentary 
Committee, the establishment of a two-year temporary zero-duty tariff quota for Tunisian olive oil 
imports into the European Single Market, and the full association of Tunisia to the EU research 
programme Horizon 2020 (Cohen-Hadria, 2018, p.23). Finally, 2018 was announced as the year of the 
awaited quantum leap in the Tunisia-EU relationship, as reflected in HR/VP Federica Mogherini’s 
statement stressing that “2018 should not be, and cannot be, just another year in our bilateral 
relations” (European External Action Service, 2018). In the Association Council session of November 
2018, Tunisia ended up jointly adopting with the EU Partnership Priorities, i.e. the new bilateral 
policy instrument envisaged by the 2015 review of the ENP, in replacement of former Action Plans, 
in order to specify “commonly identified shared interests” (European Commission, 2015, p. 4, 19) – 
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although in this particular case the document was referred to as “Strategic Priorities for 2018-2020” 
(Official Journal of the European Union, 2018). Based on this linear, positive trajectory of the 
bilateral relationship, the question now remains open as to whether Tunisia’s special status and 
ambition should involve “[outgrowing] the limits of the ENP” or the latter remains “the relevant 
framework” (Cohen-Hadria, 2018, p. 9). 
 
In Morocco, the 2011 protests were met with a series of top-down responses from the monarchy, 
including a swift constitutional reform, which succeeded in deactivating domestic unrest and ensuring 
regime continuity. “Business as usual” similarly prevailed in relations with the EU, which 
unreservedly praised monarchical reformism to the detriment of the Moroccan opposition (Fernández-
Molina, 2016, pp. 147-148). The post-uprisings landmarks in this relationship were to be found in 
2011, 2013 and 2015-2016. In 2011, the country was able to jump on the bandwagon of the 
rewards/incentives offered by the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity to those southern 
neighbours most engaged in “democratic transformation”, in spite of the absence of structural 
domestic political change. To begin with, Morocco was included as a recipient in the SPRING 
financial programme. However, the unwavering EU recognition and support had to coexist with the 
shocking news that the European Parliament withheld consent to the protocol of extension of the 2006 
EU-Morocco fisheries partnership agreement in December 2011. Such unheard-of development was 
partly motivated by the doubtful legality of the agreement’s de facto application to the territorial 
waters of Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara, which has a distinct status under international law as a 
non-self-governing territory (Fernández-Molina, 2017b, pp. 229-233) – a problem that extended to 
most bilateral economic and sectoral cooperation deals between Morocco and the EU, and was to 
usher in a new era of judicial battle led by the Polisario Front in the EU courts. Still, the European 
Parliament’s “no” vote as such was just relative hurdle, as demonstrated by the immediate start of 
negotiations on a new fisheries protocol and the same body’s consent, in February 2012, to the 2010 
EU-Morocco agricultural trade agreement, which presented similar legal issues in relation to Western 
Sahara. 
 
Next, 2013 was to be a year of achievements and progress in Morocco’s cooperation with the EU, 
including the launch of DCFTA negotiations, the conclusion of an EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership 
and the adoption of the second EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan – either preceding or following similar 
steps in Tunisia-EU relations – as well as the conclusion of a new fisheries protocol that was this time 
smoothly approved by the European Parliament. By contrast, a deep bilateral crisis broke out in 2015-
2016 owing to the first fruits of the new judicial route pursued by the Polisario Front as part of its 
“low politics” international strategy. Two consecutive rulings on the same case by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) annulled the implementation of the EU-Morocco agricultural trade 
agreement in Western Sahara (judgement of the General Court, December 2015) and finally 
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established that the deal simply does not apply there because Western Sahara is not legally part of 
Moroccan territory (final appeal ruling by Grand Chamber, December 2016). This turn of events dealt 
a severe blow to Moroccan foreign policy, which was now entering uncharted territory plagued with 
dilemmas. For the first time it was domestically felt that the country could have to choose between an 
ever-closer relationship with the EU and the nearly sacred cause of national territorial integrity 
enshrining the Moroccanity of Western Sahara (Fernández-Molina, 2017c, p. 190). Furthermore, 
another CJEU ruling with an analogous argumentation was to judge the EU-Morocco fisheries 
partnership agreement likewise inapplicable to Western Sahara’s waters in July 2018 (Fernández-
Molina & Ojeda-García, 2019). As things stand at present, while two new bilateral agreements on 
agricultural trade and fisheries replacing those affected by the 2015-2016 and 2018 CJEU rulings 
have been negotiated with the EC and approved by the European Parliament in early 2019, the 
persistent inclusion of Western Sahara in their geographical scope of application and the questionable 
impartiality of the consultation process with which the EU institutions expect to have fulfilled the 
legal requirement to obtain the “consent” of the people of Western Sahara foretell further Polisario-
led judicial battles in the CJEU and Morocco-EU diplomatic crises. 
 
In the case of Algeria, the limited national version of the 2011 Arab uprisings resulted in regime 
continuity, as in Morocco, yet the initial EU response was notably more lukewarm due to the 
awkward and unsteady historical background of bilateral relations. The subsequent bilateral 
milestones would be 2011-2012, 2015-2016 and 2017. In 2011, Brussels welcomed the lifting of the 
state of emergency and other political reforms announced by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in April, 
but unlike it neighbours Tunisia and Morocco, Algeria was not offered the first-class package of 
incentives comprising SPRING funding, DCFTA negotiations and Mobility Partnership. Actually, it 
was chiefly a U-turn on the Algerian side that led to a substantial strengthening of bilateral relations. 
In December 2011, the Algerian government took the step of agreeing to launch negotiations on an 
ENP Action Plan, after having resisted participating in the ENP for years since its inception. Also, and 
surprisingly for a state so jealous of its sovereignty, an EU Election Observation Mission was invited 
to monitor the parliamentary elections in May 2012. This unexpected receptivity was then 
reciprocated by the EU, as interest was increasing in relying on Algeria as a regional security pivot for 
dealing with crises in Mali and the entire Sahel region (Dennison, 2012). The apex of this upward 
evolution in Algeria’s cooperation with the EU was the signing, in July 2013, of a memorandum of 
understanding on an EU-Algeria Strategic Energy Partnership, which was a long-held Algerian 
aspiration (Fernández-Molina, 2017a, pp. 313-314). 
 
From this moment onwards, the Algerian eagerness to strengthen ties with the EU started to diminish, 
as apparent from the snail’s pace of the Action Plan negotiations. The perception spread that Algeria 
was recovering its negotiating strength and going back to its traditional selectiveness and 
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assertiveness. This was confirmed by the Algerian call, in August 2015, for renegotiating the 2002 
EU-Algeria Association Agreement, in force since 2005. Although justified on legitimate grounds of 
damage to the national economy (Fernández-Molina, 2018a, p. 332; Maggiolini & Talbot, 2016, pp. 
48-49), this move risked bringing bilateral relations back to square one. The response was to launch a 
joint assessment of the implementation of the Association Agreement in 2016. By the time this 
evaluation was finalised, in March 2017, the trend in bilateral relations appeared to be positive again, 
for the EU-Algeria Association Council adopted Partnership Priorities (European Council, 2017) 
precisely at this point, and outstripping its Tunisian and Moroccan counterparts.  
 
To recap, and as a basis for process tracing, a rough and tentative representation of the post-2011 
bilateral trajectories of Maghreb-EU relations at the level of political dialogue and negotiations may 
be the following. 
 
Figure 1. Bilateral trajectories of Maghreb-EU political relations, 2011-2018 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
Now, moving to the analysis, what is it that explains the three diverging trajectories of Algeria’s, 
Tunisia’s and Morocco’s foreign policies towards the EU since 2011, as well as the key turning points 
in each of them? What factors constitute drivers of change or continuity in each case? 
 
Economic (Inter)dependence with the EU 
 
The first possibility that needs to be explored, from a mixed approach halfway between international 
political economy and neoliberal IR theory, is whether any correlation can be observed between the 
Pre-2011 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Tunisia Morocco Algeria
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ups and downs of each Maghreb state’s bilateral political dialogue with the EU and the evolution of 
the corresponding bilateral economic (inter)dependence. In the case of Tunisia, the available data 
shows a steady level of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (inter)dependence with EU. The 
bilateral trade relationship has remained relatively balanced, in spite of the consistently higher weight 
of EU exports, and did not substantially deteriorate even in the context of Tunisian domestic turmoil 
following the 2011 revolution. Such economic predictability may be associated with the firm direction 
in Tunisia-EU relations and cooperation in all domains. 
 
 
Figure 2. EU trade flows and balance with Tunisia (goods), 2007-2017 
 
Source: European Commission (2019), with data from Eurostat Comext 
 
Updated and comparable data on EU FDI flows into Tunisia are difficult to find, as the available 
bilateral FDI statistics from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
stop in 2012, but the following chart gives some indication of the post-2011 overall trend. 
 
Figure 3. EU FDI flows into the Tunisian economy (US$ million[U1]) 
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Source: UNCTAD/Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014 
(https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx), data processed by 
author  
 
More distinct change can be observed in the EU’s financial assistance to Tunisia during the post-2011 
period, when it substantially rose, reaching a total of 2.4 billion euros between 2011-2017 (1.6 billion 
in grants and 800 million in macro-financial assistance) (European Commission, n.d.a). The average 
annual allocations from the ENPI and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) more than 
doubled from 80 million euros for 2007-2010 to 170 million euros for 2011-2015 (European Court of 
Auditors, 2017, p. 14). An even more dramatic increase occurred in EU official development 
assistance (ODA) to Tunisia at the 2011 turning point. Having consistently stood out as Tunisia’s 
largest donor, the EU institutions provided almost 50% of total ODA to the country in 2011-2014. 
Tunisia was the 14th top recipient of ODA from the EU institutions and EU member states in 2014 
(Maggiolini & Talbot, 2016, p.64). 
 
As for Morocco, the figures of bilateral trade with the EU have consistently grown in both the pre-
2011 and the post-2011 years, with just one brief downturn in 2009, in the wake of the 2008 global 
economic and financial crisis. The recent Moroccan trade pattern with the EU differs from that of 
Tunisia for its marked upward trend as well as a more negative balance between the volume of 
exports and imports – which may be viewed as a sign of greater dependence. What both cases share is 
an apparent lack of direct impact of the 2011 uprisings. On the other hand, in contrast to the trade 
data, the Moroccan FDI dependence from the EU appears to have slightly decreased in 2013-2016, 
following a downward trend that had already started in 2010. 
 
Figure 4. EU trade flows and balance with Morocco (goods), 2007-2017 
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Source: European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade (2018c), with data from Eurostat 
Comext 
 
Figure 5. EU FDI flows into the Moroccan economy (US$ million) 
Source: 
UNCTAD/Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014 (https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-
Statistics-Bilateral.aspx), data processed by author 
 
When it comes to EU financial assistance, Morocco, which had been for years the largest recipient of 
funds from the ENPI and its predecessor the MEDA Programme, did not benefit from a doubling in 
the ENPI/ENI allocations after 2011, as did post-revolutionary Tunisia. Continuity and stability 
prevailed, although the Moroccan post-2011 average still increased and its annual figure peaked in 
2013. Somewhat similarly, the EU’s post-2011 ODA to Morocco did not grow drastically but in a 
sustained manner, experiencing a downturn later in 2014-2015, and a new uptick in 2016. 
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In the case of Algeria, unlike Tunisia and Morocco, there has been a distinct decreasing trend in both 
trade and FDI interdependence with the EU since 2013. This has gone hand in hand with a reversal of 
the country’s consistently positive trade balance – the international political economy feature that has 
always set it apart from its neighbours – due to a pronounced drop in its exports to the EU, 95.7% of 
which are “mineral products” (European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade, 2018a, p. 6), i.e. 
hydrocarbons and their derivatives. The direct cause of these changes was the abrupt shrinking of 
international oil prices beginning in mid-2014, which brought them from $80-110 per barrel in 2011-
2013 to $40-60 per barrel in 2015-2017. The toll of this “oil shock” has been massive in countries that 
over-depend on energy revenues such as Algeria, where “oil and gas accounted for 97% of total 
exports, two thirds of state revenues and one third of gross domestic product in 2014” (International 
Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 2-3). As regards EU FDI flows into the Algerian economy, they were already 
diminishing since 2009. 
 
Figure 6. EU trade flows and balance with Algeria (goods), 2007-2017 
 
Source: European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade (2018a), with data from Eurostat 
Comext 
 
Regarding EU financial assistance, Algeria also stands out as a partial exception. Not having fully 
joined the ENP until 2017, the year when it concluded Partnership Priorities with the EU, the country 
was included as a recipient in the ENPI and the first tranche of the ENI, but received funding at a 
significantly lower level than Tunisia and Morocco. Commitments amounted to only €180 million 
under the ENPI I (2007-2010), €162 million under the ENPI II (2011-2013) and €148 million under 
the ENI I (2014-2017). More recently, the EU has committed an indicative allocation range of €108-
132 million from the ENI for 2018-2020 (European Commission, n.d.c). The same exceptionalism 
applies to the EU institutions’ ODA to Algeria, as can be observed in the figures below. 
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Figure 7. ODA disbursements from EU institutions to Algeria, 2008-2016 (US$ million, 2016 
constant prices) 
 
Source: OECD.Stat, data processed by author 
 
Figure 8. ODA disbursements from EU institutions to central Maghreb countries, 2008-2016 (US$ 
million, 2016 constant prices) 
 
Source: OECD.Stat, data processed by author 
 
In sum, since 2011, Tunisia has maintained a steady degree of trade and FDI (inter)dependence with 
the EU, at the same time that its dependence on EU financial assistance and ODA has risen sharply. 
This economic data correlates with the steadily upward direction of the evolution of the bilateral 
relationship at the political level. In the case of Morocco, (inter)dependence with the EU has 
substantially grown in the trade sphere and remained stable in terms of financial assistance and ODA, 
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while somewhat decreasing in the domain of FDI. Overall, with FDI being the only relatively negative 
data, economic trends fail to explain the setback and slowdown experienced by Morocco-EU relations 
since 2015-2016, which seems to have distinctly political causes, as will be discussed below. As for 
Algeria, a country where EU financial assistance and ODA have remained quite limited, the reduction 
in both trade and FDI interdependence with the EU beginning in 2013 is likely to have motivated a 
political move away from bilateral cooperation, such as the Algerian call for renegotiating the EU-
Algeria Association Agreement in 2015. 
 
Global Power Shifts and the “Rise of the Non-West” 
 
Now, moving back to the big structural picture of global politics, the analysis turns to examine 
whether the global diffusion of power and the “rise of the non-West”, which are commonly associated 
with the perceived crisis of the Western-based liberal international order, have played any role in the 
post-2011 trajectories of the central Maghreb countries’ relations with the EU. From this perspective, 
the key question is whether the EU’s presence and influence over this part of its southern 
neighbourhood is shrinking due to growing competition – in a sort of zero-sum game – from other 
global powers and “neighbours of the neighbours”, such as China, Russia, the GCC states and Turkey. 
Although there may be various parallel competition arenas, including an identity-related and 
normative one, this section focuses on the material dimension of these hypothetical developments.  
 
The first indicators worth considering are changes in the Maghreb states’ trade structures between 
2010 and 2017. In the case of Tunisia, it can be observed that the EU’s overwhelming dominance as a 
market for national exports has not only not diminished but increased from 2010 (76% of the 
country’s total exports to the world) to 2017 (78%). The combined weight of the following two states 
in the ranking, neighbouring Libya and Algeria, has barely changed over these years (7-8%), and the 
rest of the top ten trade partners make up for only 1-2% each. The trend is slightly different for 
Tunisian imports, where the EU’s share is less disproportionate and decreasing (from 62% in 2010 to 
53% in 2017), and a varied range of exporters have somewhat enlarged their presence in the country. 
Still, even the most pushing[U2] thriving of these, China, continues to fall short of reaching 10% of 
Tunisia’s total imports. 
 
Table 3. Tunisia’s top trading partners, 2010 vs. 2017 
Exports Imports 
Partner 2010 2017 Partner 2010 2017 
US$ m % US$ m % US$ m % US$ m % 
EU 12,033 76 10,553 78 EU 13,574 62 11,136 53 
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Libya 733 5 394 3 China 1,345 6 1,851 9 
Algeria 475 3 467 4 Russia 1,034 5 479 2 
USA 389 2 315 2 USA 896 4 693 3 
India 307 2 103 1 Turkey 632 3 936 4 
Switzerland 264 2 306 2 Algeria 622 3 748 4 
Morocco 232 1 185 1 South 
Korea 
347 2 225 1 
Turkey 214 1 171 1 Japan 313 1 214 1 
Brazil 116 1 17 ≈ 0 Ukraine 309 1 350 2 
Egypt 92 1 42 ≈ 0 Libya 284 1 36 ≈ 0 
World 15,847  13,524  World 21,875  20,800  
Source: IMF/Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), data processed by author 
 
In Morocco, the EU’s trade share is also over well 50% and has risen between 2010 and 2017 for both 
exports (from 59% to 64%) and imports (from 50% to 57%). The following three largest markets for 
Moroccan exports, i.e. the US, Brazil and India, make up for only 13-11% altogether. Non-EU 
imports into the Moroccan market are more significant, but none of the EU’s competitors reached the 
threshold of 10% in either 2010 – China (8%), US (7%), Saudi Arabia (6%), Russia (4%) – or 2017 – 
China (9%), US (7%), Turkey (5%). 
 
Table 4. Morocco’s top trading partners, 2010 vs. 2017 
Exports Imports 
Partner 2010 2017 Partner 2010 2017 
US$ m % US$ m % US$ m % US$ m % 
EU 9,809 59 15,885 64 EU 17,591 50 25,173 57 
India 972 6 690 3 China 2,804 8 4,087 9 
USA 602 4 1,020 4 USA 2,501 7 3,095 7 
Brazil 547 3 908 4 Saudi 2,074 6 868 2 
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Arabia 
Switzerland 311 2 157 1 Russia 1,244 4 968 2 
Turkey 271 2 664 3 Algeria 835 2 540 1 
Singapore 271 2 271 1 Brazil 761 2 719 2 
Pakistan 239 1 205 1 Turkey 760 2 1,998 5 
China 238 1 306 1 Iraq 710 2 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 
Russia 170 1 190 1 India 569 2 616 1 
World 16,511  24,585  World 35,139  44,567  
Source: IMF/Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), data processed by author 
 
In Algeria, the EU’s share of the total trade with the world has remained at around 50%, with the 
2010-2017 trend being a mixed one of growth in terms of exports (from 49% to 59%) and decrease in 
terms of imports (from 51% to 44%). The Algerian trade structure’s main differences from those of 
Tunisia and Morocco lie in its greater diversification and the much more significant weight of non-EU 
partners, such as China for imports – increasing from 11% in 2010 to 18% in 2017 – and the US for 
exports – shrinking from 24% in 2010 to 9% in 2017, though. In any case, there is no clear indication 
of decline of the EU’s dominance. 
 
Table 5. Algeria’s top trading partners, 2010 vs. 2017 
Exports Imports 
Partner 2010 2017 Partner 2010 2017 
US$ m % US$ m % US$ m % US$ m % 
EU 28,011 49 20,233 59 EU 20,431 51 19,535 44 
USA 13,827 24 3,242 9 China 4,441 11 8,149 18 
Canada 2,971 5 625 2 USA 2,116 5 1,749 4 
Turkey 2,704 5 1,368 4 South 
Korea 
1,975 5 1,640 4 
Brazil 2,415 4 2,144 6 Turkey 1,515 4 1,967 4 
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India 1,565 3 871 2 Japan 1,509 4 434 1 
China 1,173 2 688 2 Argentina 1,216 3 1,495 3 
South 
Korea 
1,158 2 874 3 Brazil 902 2 1,356 3 
Morocco 713 1 430 1 India 772 2 960 2 
Tunisia 536 1 386 1 Switzerland 588 1 335 1 
World 57,000  34,372  World 40,449  44,733  
Source: IMF/Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), data processed by author 
 
Reliable and similarly comparable data on the Maghreb states’ FDI structure are hard to find (Cohen-
Hadria, 2018, p. 16) – an acknowledged limitation of this paper – but the following tables provide 
some evidence of the relative presence of EU FDI as compared to other sources in each of them. Here 
the three countries’ pictures are contrasting. Tunisia’s is by far the most Europeanised one, for EU 
member states were the source of at least 75% of FDI flows into the national economy in 2017. Qatar 
appears as the only non-European country on the list and provided just 6% of FDI. The Moroccan FDI 
structure is in a sort of middle-ground situation, as it is substantially more diversified and less 
dominated by EU investors than Tunisia’s, yet still quite Western-led. In 2017, the EU member states’ 
combined share amounted to 42.2% of the total FDI inflows, while the US provided 21.4% and GCC 
states 19.3%. On the other extreme, although the data is not comparable, among the providers of FDI 
in Algeria for 2002-2017, Arab countries, presumably from the GCC, are the largest source (42%) and 
considerably outstrip EU member states (26%). 
 
Table 6. Tunisia’s FDI structure, 2017 
Investment partners % FDI inflows 
France 44 
Germany 10 
Italy 7 
Qatar 6 
Spain 6 
Netherlands 5 
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Switzerland 4 
Luxembourg 3 
Others 15 
Source: Santander Trade Portal (https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-
overseas/tunisia/foreign-investment), with data from Tunisian Investment Agency 
 
Table 7. Morocco’s FDI structure, 2017 
Investment partners % FDI inflows 
France 31.4 
USA 21.4 
UAE 10.3 
Netherlands 6.4 
Saudi Arabia 6.1 
UK 4.4 
China 3.3 
Qatar 2.9 
Others 13.8 
Source: Santander Trade Portal (https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-
overseas/morocco/foreign-investment), with data from Foreign Exchange Office of Morocco’s 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Table 8. Algeria’s FDI structure, 2017 
Investment partners % FDI inflows 
Arab countries 42 
EU 26 
Non-EU Europe 19 
Asia 7 
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America 3 
Africa 2 
Multinationality 1 
Australia ≈ 0 
Source: Algerian National Agency of Investment Development 
(http://www.andi.dz/index.php/en/declaration-d-investissement/bilan-des-declarations-d-
investissement-2002-2018), data processed by author  
 
In short, the economic/material impact of the global “rise of the non-West” on the central Maghreb 
countries has been thus far limited and mixed, varying across indicators. Developments over the 
2010-2017 period have not substantially altered the Maghrebi trade structures, the three of which 
remain distinctly dominated by exchanges with the EU, although specific situations range along a 
continuum – with Tunisian trade being the most heavily Europeanised, Algerian the relatively most 
diversified and Moroccan lying in-between. From the non-Western rising powers, the trade giant 
China appears as the second top trading partner for all the three countries, yet lagging hugely behind 
the EU. In 2017, it only represented 11.2% of world trade for Algeria, 6.4% for Morocco and 5.6% 
for Tunisia, being significantly more important for Algeria than for the others, and significantly more 
important for imports than for exports across the three cases. Russia occupies a quite modest place as 
6th top trading partner for Tunisia (1.6% of world trade), 7th for Morocco (1.7%) and 9th for Algeria 
(1.5%). The best placed regional power is Turkey, which stands as 4th top trading partner for Tunisia 
(3.4% of world trade), 4th for Morocco (3.8%) and 5th for Algeria (4.2%). The GCC countries are 
virtually absent from the Maghreb states’ “top ten” in terms of trade, with only Saudi Arabia being the 
8th top trading partner for Morocco (1.4% of world trade). Non-Western presence is definitely more 
important in the domain of FDI, in this case led by the GCC states. Here there is also a Tunisia-
Morocco-Algeria continuum in terms of (de-) Europeanisation. The first two national FDI structures 
remain Western-dominated but the Algerian one appears to be notably less so. Finally, moving away 
from the economic sphere, a remaining question is whether global power shifts may be having greater 
impact on the Maghreb for their political/normative dimension than in strictly material terms. 
 
National Security, Territoriality and Sovereignty 
 
The lenses of classical realism in IR suggest zooming in from the big structural picture of global 
politics to the specific states we are dealing with and what each of them views as its national interest 
in terms of security, territoriality and sovereignty. For Tunisia, the chief security concern of the post-
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2011 years was the spill-over of the conflict in neighbouring Libya. The situation of virtual state 
collapse in the wake of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime had unleashed forced migration flows, 
arms trafficking and a surge of terrorist activity – including the new Libyan branch of the Islamic state 
group – across the country’s uncontrolled borders. In a way, “Tunisia’s ‘Libyan problem’ of the 2010s 
was the new ‘Algerian problem’ of the 1960s” (Fernández-Molina, 2018b, p. 8). The domestic effects 
of such instability included a number of high-profile attacks on Tunisian soil, which raised the spectre 
of transnational terrorism and home-grown radicalisation fuelling political polarisation, and ultimately 
derailing the fragile Tunisian transition. This was to be a sustained threat for years, although the 
perception of its severity would be relatively diminished after the attacks in Tunis (Bardo National 
Museum) and Sousse in March and June 2015. The Tunisian response consisted of redoubling efforts 
to secure the state’s own borders and to increase regional cooperation on border security with Libya 
and Algeria. The EU approach in this respect largely concurred with Tunisia’s, especially when the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian mission EU Border Assistance Mission in 
Libya (EUBAM) was deployed in 2013-2014, in order to help build Libya’s border control capacities 
(European External Action Service, 2018). Therefore, while bearing no direct connection with 
Tunisia’s EU policy, if anything, concerns about regional insecurity may have positively impacted the 
bilateral relationship. 
 
The linkage between relations with the EU and national security, territoriality and sovereignty was to 
become more convoluted in the case of Morocco. Morocco’s longstanding core interest in the latter 
sphere is the international recognition of its de facto annexation of Western Sahara, which is seen as a 
non-negotiable component of national territorial integrity. This had never posed any obstacle for an 
ever-strengthening and ostensibly “advanced” bilateral relationship with the EU until the 2010s, when 
the Polisario Front’s “low politics” international strategy – refocusing on the denunciation of 
Morocco’s human rights violations and economic exploitation of the natural resources of Western 
Sahara – started to harvest its first fruits. While provoking a series of unprecedented human rights-
related diplomatic crises between Morocco, on the one hand, and the UN and the US, on the other, in 
2012-2013, the Sahrawi “low politics” strategy made it into the EU arena by concentrating on the 
issue of natural resources and the contentious legality of the de facto inclusion of Western Sahara in 
EU-Morocco cooperation agreements. The Polisario Front has pursued this new strategy combining 
parliamentary and judicial routes. Their main achievement through the former, i.e. the European 
Parliament’s 2011 rejection of the EU-Morocco fisheries protocol, was experienced by Morocco as an 
unimaginable, never expected political setback, although it ultimately only had a short-lived effect in 
practice. Much more worrisome for Moroccan interests in the long term were the CJEU rulings on the 
EU-Morocco agricultural trade agreement and fisheries partnership agreement in 2015-2016 and 2018 
respectively (see above): “Altogether, these cases are producing strong jurisprudence requiring the EU 
to start territorially differentiating between economic activities and products originating from the 
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internationally-recognised Morocco and the Western Sahara territory it controls, as increasingly done 
with Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories” (Fernández-Molina & Ojeda-García, 2019). 
 
Accordingly, the Moroccan reaction to such unparalleled structural crisis in its much-cherished 
relationship with the EU has somewhat got out of the norm of the country’s traditional foreign policy 
orientation. Rational-choice responses to the perceived threat to national interest have included, in the 
first place, recourse to tactical issue-linkage and even overt threats to decrease Moroccan cooperation 
on migration and border control as a transit state for EU-bound migration flows. In the words of the 
Moroccan Minister of Agriculture and king’s strongman Aziz Akhannouch: “How do you 
[Europeans] want us to do the job of blocking African emigration if Europe does not want to work 
with us today? (…) Why are we going to continue to act as gendarmes (…)?” (Otazu, 2017). 
Secondly, King Mohammed VI himself put on stage the possibility of Morocco shifting alliances 
away from the EU, prioritising rising powers and regional partners over its longstanding postcolonial 
attachment. In an unusual diplomatic display, he made two consecutive state visits to Russia and 
China, in March and May 2016 respectively. These were followed by a series of royal “African tours” 
between 2016 and 2018, in the midst of a new narrative on Morocco’s so-called “new African policy” 
that was actively disseminated by a wave of semi-official think tank publications. It is still too early to 
assess the seriousness and viability of the suggested foreign policy reorientation, and the European 
Commission and Council are striving to square the circle by negotiating new EU-Morocco 
cooperation agreements that both meet the CJEU legal requirements and include Western Sahara. Yet, 
it is clear that the territorial issue has changed the course of Morocco’s EU policy after the 2015-2016 
turning point. Among other things, the country has willingly given up its position as the ENP’s 
southern frontrunner and has not negotiated Partnership Priorities with the EU yet, unlike Algeria and 
Tunisia. 
 
In the case of the Algerian authorities, the overriding security concern in the context of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings was first and foremost one of regime security. Their perception of regime vulnerability and 
regional political isolation grew as like-minded authoritarian regimes fell in neighbouring Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya, and Islamist parties started to win elections in these countries as well as Morocco. 
This temporary pressure has been related to the adaptive U-turn that the Algerian attitude towards 
bilateral cooperation with the EU took in 2011-2012, when this state became involved in the ENP for 
the first time – a quite plausible rational choice with the aim of gaining international backing 
(Fernández-Molina, 2018a; Hernando de Larramendi & Fernández-Molina, 2015, pp. 259-261). 
Subsequently, a second post-2011 security challenge for Algeria was the rising instability of the Sahel 
in general and Mali in particular on its southern borders, most notably during the 2012-2013 Northern 
Mali conflict provoked by the Tuareg insurrection and transnational terrorist takeover in so-called 
Azawad. This was linked to relations with the EU because of the European expectation that Algeria 
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acted as a regional security provider, given its geographical contiguity, status as a regional military 
power and longstanding contacts with – or knowledge of – Tuareg and terrorist groups in the area.  
 
As plans gained momentum for an international military intervention to help the Malian government 
retake the north, pressure intensified on the Algerian authorities to become involved as a regional 
partner. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika refused to do so and kept advocating a “political solution” to 
the conflict for a mix of normative grounds and rational choice reasons. The latter were driven by fear 
that Western intervention would further destabilise the Algerian historical backyard and terrorist 
activity would spill over into the country’s own territory through its lengthy and porous Saharan 
borders. Additionally, growing Western diplomatic courtship of Algeria rationally constituted an 
opportunity for this state to raise its international profile and increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the EU and its member states. This has been hypothesised as a potential explanation for the slowdown 
in the Algerian pro-EU efforts after the 2011-2012 turning point (Dennison, 2012). Later on, a similar 
sort of pragmatic calculation ended up leading the Algerian authorities to authorise French airplanes 
to fly over their airspace once a military operation started in January 2013 (Hernando de Larramendi 
& Fernández-Molina, 2015, pp. 251-252). 
 
Overall, it appears that rational choices in the face of perceived challenges to national security have 
considerable explanatory power in accounting for specific turning points in Morocco and Algeria’s 
foreign policies towards the EU, though less so in the case of Tunisia, where the bilateral trajectory 
has been much more linear. Aside from this, the relationship between these security concerns and 
relations with the EU has been different in each Maghreb country’s case: one of convergence for 
Tunisia, clash for Morocco and opportunity for Algeria.  
 
National Identities and Foreign Policy Roles 
 
Finally, it is important to consider dynamics beyond rational choice, such as the impact of the 
identity-related and normative factors prioritised by constructivism upon the central Maghreb 
countries’ recent foreign policy trajectories vis-à-vis the EU. A particularly interesting driver of 
foreign policy change that falls within this category is role conflict. Based on an understanding of 
foreign policy roles as social constructions resulting from the interaction between an actor/nation 
state’s self-conceptions (ego) and external expectations or prescriptions (alter) regarding its place in 
the world, there is the possibility of contradiction between two or more roles stemming from different 
domestic or international sources, or formulated in different historical contexts. Role conflict may 
result in foreign policy dysfunctions and, for better or worse, is also a key driver of foreign policy 
change (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012, pp. 10-11). 
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In the case of Tunisia, the main instance of role conflict observed in the post-2011 context has not 
been directly related to the EU. It concerned the politics of foreign debt and the contradictory 
pressures in this respect stemming from the global and domestic spheres in the aftermath of the 
revolution. The dilemma was between acting as a “poster child for the IMF” – accepting new 
borrowing, structural reforms and austerity measures – and the “success story of the Arab Spring” – 
prioritising socioeconomic inclusion, job creation and pro-poor policies in order to stabilise the 
democratic transition process (Fernández-Molina, 2018b, p. 3). Tunisia’s EU policy did not pose such 
difficult quandaries, as post-2011 domestic political elites and public opinion maintained a quite large 
favourable consensus on the EU, with 76% of Tunisians having a positive or neutral image thereof, 
and 64% describing the bilateral relationship as good in some polls (EU Neighbours, 2017). Brussels’ 
voiced “support and recognition to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations” reinforced 
the country’s longstanding foreign policy role as a “model student of the EU” in a sort of identity-
based virtuous circle. 
 
Figure 9. Answers to 2017 opinion poll about Tunisian perceptions of the EU 
 
Source: EU Neighbours (2017c) 
 
By contrast, in the case of Morocco, since 2015-2016 the CJEU rulings and related developments 
have provoked an outstanding role conflict between the country’s two core and longstanding foreign 
policy roles, thus far compatible, as “champion of national territorial integrity” and “model student of 
the EU” (Fernández-Molina, 2017c, p. 190). Besides rational-choice responses, the Moroccan official 
reaction has included a good deal of rhetorical action and normative contestation. Recent speeches by 
King Mohammed VI have displayed an anticolonial tone unusual for this country, questioning the 
imposition of European/Western conditionality on African states, disputing positive perceptions of the 
Arab Spring and its consequences, highlighting the European contradictions and failure to live up to 
their own norms and values in migration policies, emphasising alternative normative references such 
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as the GCC countries and stressing the norm of national sovereignty (Ministere de la Culture et de la 
Communication, 2016; Ministere de la Culture et de la Communication, 2017). However, according to 
the available poll data, the suggested normative detachment from the EU at the regime/elite level does 
not seem to be supported by a majority of Moroccan public opinion. The latter appears to persist in its 
traditional positive appraisal of the EU, its relations with Morocco and its effects on Morocco’s 
stability (on Moroccan public opinion attitudes towards international relations and the EU, see also 
ArabTrans, 2016a, pp. 72-76). Furthermore, in both Moroccan and Tunisian public opinion, the 
approval rate for leaders of rising powers such as China and Russia is no better than that of the EU. 
 
Figure 10. Answers to 2017 opinion poll about Moroccan perceptions of the EU 
 
Source: EU Neighbours (2017b) 
 
In the case of Algeria, two instances of role conflict can be observed in the post-2011 period. The first 
of them is the tension between the country’s deeply embedded postcolonial role as anti-Western and 
non-aligned “third world leader” – which has historically led it to act as a sort of “bad student” with a 
long record of “awkwardness” (Darbouche 2008, p. 372) in its relations with the EU – and the 
possibility of becoming a “good student” following the 2011-2012 turning point. The latter role and 
the engagement with the ENP were also at odds with Algeria’s role as a “sovereignty champion” 
strictly opposed to any form of conditionality and interference in domestic affairs, which seemed to 
resurface with the call for the Association Agreement to be renegotiated in 2015. However, the EU 
was able to ease this contradiction by launching the joint assessment of the implementation of the 
Association Agreement and swiftly negotiating Partnership Priorities with Algeria. Regarding the 
2017 Partnership Priorities, it has been rightly pointed out that, rather than the content of the policy 
document, “what is more important is that the EU appears to have responded to the criticism of the 
irrelevance of the prior frameworks for engagement with Algeria.” “Accommodating in this way the 
‘Algerian specificity’ in the overall ENP framework is therefore a prime example of greater 
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differentiation avowed in the 2015 revision of the ENP” (Ovádek & Wouters, 2017, p. 16). The 
second case of role conflict where the Algerian struggled to strike a pragmatic balance pitted, on the 
one hand, Algeria’s self-conception as “third world leader” and “sovereignty champion”, and on the 
other, the European/Western demand for it to act as a “regional security pivot” during the 2012-2013 
Northern Mali conflict, including support for an international military intervention. Interestingly, 
according to existing poll data, Algerian public opinion perceptions of the EU are as predominantly 
positive as those of Tunisians and Moroccans. 
 
Figure 11. Answers to 2017 opinion poll about Algerian perceptions of the EU 
 
Source: EU Neighbours (2017a) 
 
Conclusion: De-Europeanisation? 
 
By way of conclusion, from the four sets of factors considered in process tracing, the strong economic 
(inter)dependence with the EU appears to have remained largely a driver of continuity in the central 
Maghreb countries’ EU policies since 2011. The only significant instance of change of this origin is 
the reduction in Algeria-EU trade and FDI interdependence in the context of the 2014 “oil shock”, 
which may have been associated with the ensuing Algerian call for renegotiating the EU-Algeria 
Association Agreement. As regards global power shifts and the “rise of the non-West”, their impact 
on the Maghreb has been so far limited and mixed in its economic/material dimension. The Tunisian, 
Moroccan and Algerian trade structures did not significantly change between 2010 and 2017, and 
remain heavily dominated by exchanges with the EU – with China lagging hugely behind – although 
non-Western and especially GCC presence is much more relevant in terms of FDI. The drivers of 
change that explain specific turning points in each country’s bilateral relationships with the EU are 
mostly rational choices in the face of perceived challenges to national security, territoriality and 
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sovereignty in the classical realist sense, as well as identity tensions resulting from foreign policy role 
conflicts. In such cases, and going back to the big structural picture, the putative decline of the 
Western-based liberal international order, including the EU’s “normative power” over its 
neighbourhood, may be providing increased opportunities for the normative and rhetorical 
disengagement of longstanding “model students” such as Morocco. This could be viewed as a 
potential scenario of normative “de-Europeanisation” following in the steps of Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit 
& Kaliber, 2016), yet with the paradox that the material structure of the country’s heavy 
(inter)dependence with the EU remains largely unchanged. In other words, global power shifts may be 
having greater impact on the Maghreb for their political/normative dimension than in strictly material 
terms. And if there is such thing as de-Europeanisation in the Maghreb, we are mainly talking about 
“de-Europeanisation through discourse” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016). 
 
References 
 
Acharya, A. (2014). The end of American world order. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Aghrout, A. (2000). From preferential status to partnership: The Euro-Maghreb relationship. New 
York: Palgrave. 
 
ArabTrans. (2016a). The Arab Transformations Report on Political, Economic and Social Attitudes, 
2014: Morocco, September, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311616891_The_Arab_Transformations_Report_on_Politic
al_Economic_and_Social_Attitudes_2014_Morocco.  
 
ArabTrans. (2016b) The Arab Transformations Report on Political, Economic and Social Attitudes, 
2013: Tunisia, September, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311617325_The_Arab_Transformations_Report_on_Politic
al_Economic_and_Social_Attitudes_2013_Tunisia.  
 
ArabTrans. (2016c) The Arab Transformations Report on Political, Economic and Social Attitudes, 
2013: Algeria, September, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311617105_The_Arab_Transformations_Report_on_Politic
al_Economic_and_Social_Attitudes_2013_Algeria.   
 
ArabTrans. (2016d) The Arab Transformations Project. After the Arab Uprisings: Political, 
Social and Economic Attitudes in the MENA Region in 2014, December, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311680664_WP6_The_Arab_Transformations_Project_Afte
30 
 
r_the_Arab_Uprisings_Political_Social_and_Economic_Attitudes_in_the_MENA_Region_in_2014.
[EDITOR3] 
 
Attinà, F. (2003). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership assessed: The realist and liberal views.  
European Foreign Affairs Review, 8(2), 181-199. 
 
Aydın-Düzgit, S. (2016). De-Europeanisation through discourse: A critical discourse analysis of 
AKP’s election speeches.  South European Society and Politics, 21(1), 45-58. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1147717  
 
Aydın-Düzgit, S., & Kaliber, A. (2016). Encounters with Europe in an era of domestic and 
international turmoil: Is Turkey a de-Europeanising candidate country? South European Society and 
Politics, 21(1), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1155282  
 
Barbé, E., & Herranz-Surrallés, A. (Eds.). (2012). The challenge of differentiation in Euro-
Mediterranean relations: Flexible regional cooperation or fragmentation. Oxon/New York: 
Routledge.  
 
Bicchi, F., Noutcheva, G., & Voltolini, B. (2018). The European Neighbourhood Policy between 
bilateralism and region-building. In T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti & Th. Demmelhuber (Eds.), The 
Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy (pp.249-258). Oxon/New York: 
Routledge.  
 
Bump, Ph. (2018, June 29). Where the U.S. has considered leaving or left international agreements 
under Trump. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/29/where-the-u-s-has-considered-
leaving-or-left-international-agreements-under-trump/?utm_term=.e1cd9ad9952d  
 
Cantir, C., & Kaarbo, J. (2012). Contested roles and domestic politics: Reflections on role theory in 
foreign policy analysis and IR theory. Foreign Policy Analysis, 8(1), 5-24. DOI: 10.1111/j.1743-
8594.2011.00156.x 
 
Cohen-Hadria, E. (Ed.). (2018). The EU-Tunisia privileged partnership: What next?. Barcelona: 
EuroMeSCo/IEMed. 
 
Costalli, S. (2009). Power over the Sea: The relevance of neoclassical realism to Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. Mediterranean Politics, 14(3), 323-342. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390903346814  
31 
 
 
Council of the European Union. (2012). Conseil d’Association UE-Tunisie, 19 November, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-12-479_fr.htm.[EDITOR4] 
 
Council of the European Union.  (1995). Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference. Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf  
 
Daoudy, M. (2016). The structure-identity nexus: Syria and Turkey’s collapse (2011). Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, 29(3), 1074-1096. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1231659  
 
Darbouche, H. (2008). Decoding Algeria’s ENP policy: Differentiation by other means? 
Mediterranean Politics, 13(3), 371-389. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390802386770  
 
Dennison, S.  (2012). The EU, Algeria and the northern Mali question. European Council on Foreign 
Relations. Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR69_ALGERIA_MEMO_AW.pdf  
 
Duncombe, C., & Dunne, T. (2018). After liberal world order. International Affairs, 94(1), 25-42. 
Retrieved from https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/after-liberal-world-order  
 
European External Action Service. (2018, February 5). Tunisia: Acting together to provide practical 
responses to the expectations of the Tunisian people. Retrieved from  
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39661/tunisia-acting-together-provide-
practical-responses-expectations-tunisian-people_en  
 
European Council. (2011, 9 March). Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on 
Arrival to the Extraordinary European Council, 11 March. Retrieved from 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119673.pdf  
 
EU Neighbours. (2017a, December 14). Opinion poll 2017 – Algeria [Factsheet]. Retrieved from 
https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/publications/opinion-poll-2017-algeria-
factsheet.  
 
EU Neighbours. (2017b, December 14). Opinion poll 2017 – Morocco [Factsheet]. Retrieved from 
https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/publications/opinion-poll-2017-morocco-
factsheet. 
 
32 
 
EU Neighbours. (2017c, December 14). Opinion poll 2017 – Tunisia [Factsheet]. Retrieved from 
https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/publications/opinion-poll-2017-tunisia-
factsheet.  
 
European Commission. (n.d.a). Tunisia. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/tunisia_en.   
 
European Commission. (n.d.b). Morocco. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/morocco_en.  
 
European Commission. (n.d.c). Algeria. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/algeria_en.  
 
European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade (2018a) European Union, Trade in Goods with 
Algeria, 16 April, 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_algeria_en.pdfhttp://trade.ec.euro
pa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113343.pdf. 
 
European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade (2018b) Algeria, 17 April, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/algeria/. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111616.pdf  
 
European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade (2018c) European Union, Trade in Goods with 
Morocco, 16 April, 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_morocco_en.pdf. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113421.pdf.  
 
European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade (2018d) Morocco, 17 April, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/morocco/http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111609.pdf.
[EDITOR5][FI6] 
 
European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade (2018e) Tunisia, 26 October, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/tunisia/http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111593.pdf. 
[EDITOR7] 
 
33 
 
European Commission. (2019). European Union, trade in goods with Tunisia. Retrieved from 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_tunisia_en.pdf.  
 
European Commission. (2011a, March 8). Joint Communication to the European Council, the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions. A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. 
COM (2011) 200 final. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf  
 
European Commission. (2011b, May 25). A new response to a changing neighbourhood. A review of 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission. COM (2011) 303. Retrieved from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/ enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf  
 
European Commission. (2015, November 18). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Review of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. JOIN (2015) 50 final. Retrieved from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/ 151118_ jointcommunication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf  
 
European Commission.  (2016, September 29).  Joint Communication to the European Parliament and 
the Council. Strengthening EU Support for Tunisia.  JOIN(2016) 47 final. Retrieved from 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v6_p1_859678-
2.pdf  
 
European Court of Auditors. (2017). Special report: EU assistance to Tunisia. Retrieved from 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR17_3/SR_TUNISIA_EN.pdf.  
 
European External Action Service. (n.d). EU border assistance mission in Libya (EUBAM). Retrieved 
from https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya_en.  
 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (2007) Morocco: 2007-2010 National 
Indicative Programme, https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/morocco-national-indicative-
programme-2007-2010.[EDITOR8] 
 
European Council. (2017). EU-Algeria Association Council. Shared partnership priorities of the 
people’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (Algeria) and the European Union (EU) under the Revised 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Retrieved from 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24089/st03101-ad01fr17.pdf  
34 
 
 
Official Journal of the European Union. (2018, November 20). Decision No 1/2018 of the EU-Tunisia 
Association Council of 9 November 2018 adopting the EU-Tunisia strategic priorities for the period 
2018-2020. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22018D1792&from=FR  
 
Fernández-Molina, I. (2016). Moroccan foreign policy under Mohammed VI, 1999–2014. Oxon/New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Fernández-Molina, I. (2017a). EU and EU Member States’ responses to the Arab Spring. In I. 
Szmolka (Ed.), Political change in the Middle East and North Africa (pp.301-325). Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Fernández-Molina, I. (2017b). The EU, the ENP and the Western Sahara conflict: Executive 
continuity and parliamentary detours. In D. Bouris & T. Schumacher (Eds.), The Revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and change in EU foreign policy (pp.219-238). New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Fernández-Molina, I. (2017c). The limits of Morocco’s ‘exceptional’ stability: Post-election deadlock, 
contestation on the periphery and foreign policy dilemmas. In IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2017 
(pp.187-190). Barcelona: IEMed.  
 
Fernández-Molina, I. (2018a). The European Neighbourhood Policy and EU-Maghreb relations. In T. 
Schumacher, A. Marchetti & Th. Demmelhuber (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (pp.324-335). Oxon/New York: Routledge.  
 
Fernández-Molina, I. (2018b). Modelling for a living: Two-level games and rhetorical action in the 
foreign debt negotiations of post-revolutionary Tunisia.  The Journal of North African Studies. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2018.1454649. 
 
Fernández-Molina, I., Feliu, L., & and Hernando de Larramendi, M. (2018). The ‘subaltern’ foreign 
policies of North African countries: Old and new responses to economic dependence, regional 
insecurity and domestic political change.  The Journal of North African Studies. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2018.1454648.  
 
35 
 
Fernández-Molina, I., & Ojeda-García, R. (2019, in press).  Western Sahara as a hybrid of a parastate 
and a state-in-exile: (Extra)territoriality and the small print of sovereignty in a context of frozen 
conflict. Nationalities Papers. 
 
Ghanem, D., & Kuznetsov, V. (2018, June 13). Moscow’s Maghreb moment. Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/76572  
 
Gstöhl, S., & Lannon, E. (2018). The neighbours of the EU’s neighbours: Overcoming geographical 
silos. In T. Schumacher, A.  Marchetti & Th. Demmelhuber (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook on the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (pp.522-532). Oxon/New York: Routledge.  
 
Hami, H. (2003). L’ambivalence salutaire. Essai sur la logique du conflit et de la coopération au 
Maghreb. Rabat: REMALD. 
 
Hanieh, A. (2013). Lineages of revolt: Issues of contemporary capitalism in the Middle East. 
Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
 
Hernando de Larramendi, M., & Fernández-Molina, I. (2015). The evolving foreign policies of North 
African states (2011-2014): New trends in constraints, political processes and behaviour.  In Y.H. 
Zoubir & G. White (Eds.), North African politics: Change and continuity (pp.245-276). Oxon/New 
York: Routledge.  
 
Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7-23. 
Retrieved from 
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/inta94_1_2_241_ikenberry.pdf  
 
International Crisis Group. (2018, November 19). Breaking Algeria’s economic paralysis. Retrieved 
from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/192-breaking-algerias-
economic-paralysis  
 
Juncos, A. E. (2017). Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: A pragmatist turn. European 
Security, 26(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2016.1247809  
 
36 
 
Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2014). The foreign policy of the European Union (2nd ed.). New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Ministere de la Culture et de la Communication. (2016, April 20). Discours prononcé par SM le Roi 
devant le Sommet Maroc-Pays du Golfe à Ryad. Retrieved from http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-
royaux/texte-integral-du-discours-prononce-par-sm-le-roi-devant-le-sommet-maroc-pays-du.  
 
Ministere de la Culture et de la Communication. (2017, November 29). Message de SM le Roi au 
5ème Sommet Union Africaine-Union Européenne à Abidjan. Retrieved from 
http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/message-de-sm-le-roi-au-5eme-sommet-union-africaine-
union-europeenne-abidjan.  
 
Lannon, E. (2015). ‘More for more and less for less’: From the rhetoric to the implementation of the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument in the context of the 2015 ENP review. In IEMed 
Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 (pp.220-224).  Barcelona: IEMed.  
 
Maggiolini, P., & Talbot, V. (2016). The impact of the European Union in Arab countries and the 
impact of the Arab transformations upon the EU.  The Arab Transformations Project. 
 
Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40(2), 235-258. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353  
 
Nye, J. S., Jr. (2017). Will the liberal order survive? The history of an idea. Foreign Affairs, 96(1), 10-
16. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive 
 
Otazu, J. (2017, February 6). Marruecos advierte a la UE de las consecuencias si no habla con una 
sola voz. La Vanguardia. Retrieved from   
https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170206/414056941698/marruecos-advierte-a-la-ue-de-las-
consecuencias-si-no-habla-con-una-sola-voz.html  
 
Ovádek, M., & Wouters, J. (2017). Differentiation in disguise? EU instruments of bilateral 
booperation in the Southern Neighbourhood. KU Leuven/Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies. Retrieved from 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/2017/187ovadekwouters  
 
Philippart, E. (2003). The Euro-Mediterranean partnership: A critical evaluation of an ambitious 
Scheme. European Foreign Affairs Review, 8(2), 201-220. 
37 
 
 
Schumacher, T., & Fernández-Molina, I. (2013, August). EU and GCC countries’ foreign policies and 
the Mediterranean Neighbourhood. Towards synergetic cooperation? Gulf Research Center. Retrieved 
from  
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/168278/EU_and_GCC_Countries%E2%80%99_Foreign_Policies_and_t
he_Mediterranean_Neighborhood_1040.pdf0.pdf  
 
Solingen, E., & Şenses Ozyurt, S. (2006). Mare Nostrum? The sources, logic, and dilemmas of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In E. Adler, F. Bicchi, B. Crawford, & R. A. Del Sarto (Eds.), The 
convergence of civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean region (pp.51-82). Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.  
 
Stora, B. (2003). Algeria/Morocco: The passions of the past. Representations of the nation that unite 
and divide. The Journal of North African Studies, 8(1), 14-34. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380308718493  
 
Taylor, P. (2015, September 27). EU ‘ring of friends’ turns into ring of fire.  Reuters. Retrieved from 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-neighbourhood-analysi-
idUSKCN0RR09020150927  
